Research
Research
The Interplay of Military Intervention and Peacemaking
Status: under review
Abstract: This article addresses the question of when a powerful third party has incentives to combine military intervention with peacemaking measures. Developing a formal model in which a foreign actor decides (1) whether to provide military support to its protégé and (2) whether to facilitate a peace settlement through security guarantees, I show that the two instruments can be either complementary or contradictory to each other, depending on the relative strength of the. If the protégé is relatively weak, the two instruments are complementary: security guarantees lock the protégé's gains from military support into a settlement, and military support improves the protégé's welfare in the settlement. A foreign actor who sufficiently values its protégé will combine these two instruments. Conversely, if the protégé is strong, the two instruments are contradictory: a settlement wastes the benefits of military support, while military support renders peacemaking efforts ineffective. The foreign actor will use at most one of the two instruments. The theory identifies conditions under which it is in the interest of a biased foreign actor to act as a neutral peacemaker. It also highlights the importance of introducing a second source of leverage beyond the mere manipulation of battlefield power in achieving meaningful peacemaking.
Leader-Contingent Sanctions as a Cause of Violent Political Conflict. 2025. Political Science Research and Methods, 13(1): 36-55. link
Abstract: Economic sanctions are a policy tool that great powers frequently use to interfere with domestic politics of another state. Regime change has been a primary goal of economic sanctions over the past decades. This article studies the relationship between leader-contingent sanctions---sanctions that are designed to impede the flow of revenue to a specific leader---and violent political conflict in target countries. I build a theoretical model to illuminate two mechanisms by which leader-contingent sanctions destabilize a regime---the Depletion Mechanism and the Instigation Mechanism. The Depletion Mechanism works when sanctions mechanically deplete the government's resources so that it becomes unable to buy off domestic opposition even by making the largest possible offer. The Instigation Mechanism implies that as sanctions decrease the benefit of negotiated settlement relative to war, the government may strategically choose to repress rather than buy off the opposition even when it is able to do so. Leader-contingent sanctions lead to bargaining failure by rewarding the opposition for revolt while reducing the government's ability and willingness to appease the opposition.
Intervention in the Shadow of Leadership Turnover (with Liqun Liu)
Status: working paper
Abstract: We develop a dynamic model to investigate how leadership turnover in a patron state affects the incumbent leader's decision to support a protégé involved in an external conflict. We identify two distinct mechanisms by which the prospect of losing office can incentivize the incumbent leader to increase support. The free-riding mechanism occurs when the incumbent, facing imminent departure, becomes less concerned about the long-term consequences of intervention and thus more willing to intervene, anticipating that the successor will address any battlefield setbacks. The entrapment mechanism operates when the incumbent expects a more dovish successor and deliberately escalates the conflict to ensure the successor's continued involvement. By encouraging the protégé to fight and potentially suffer early losses, the incumbent increases the likelihood that the successor will be compelled to remain engaged despite a preference for disengagement. Our theory offers a novel explanation for how a war that appears statically inefficient can be dynamically optimal.
The Presidential and Congressional Politics of US Foreign Aid
Status: work in progress
Abstract: This project explores how US presidents might use foreign aid budget proposals as a tool to pursue their foreign policy objectives. Empirical evidence shows that the amount of foreign aid requested by US presidents is significantly higher in presidential election years than in non-election years, while the amount of aid appropriated by Congress is not affected by election years. The effect of election years on presidential budget requests exists across different types of aid, such as security assistance, economic development assistance, and democracy and human rights assistance. In addition, the effect of election years on presidential budget requests is greater for states without formal alliance treaties with the US than for states with formal alliance treaties. Moreover, there is sometimes a gap between presidential budget proposals and congressional commitments, and this gap is significantly larger in presidential election years. This project seeks plausible explanations for these empirical patterns and provides insights into the nuanced relationship between presidential budget proposals and congressional commitments.
Misaligned Interests and the Credibility of Alleged Support. 2025. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 37(3): 232-257. link
Abstract: When can a third party manipulate the bargaining dynamics between its protégé and its adversary through diplomacy? I develop a formal model in which (1) the third party and its protégé have misaligned interests, and (2) the disputants bargain simultaneously over two issue dimensions---one capturing common interests, the other capturing misaligned interests between the allies. The results show that when the protégé and its patron have heterogeneous preferences for the disputed issues, the protégé will not necessarily use the patron's support in the way the patron wants. Patron's support increases the protégé's bargaining leverage, and how the protégé will use this increased leverage at the negotiating table directly affects the way the patron communicates. The existence of misaligned interests will increase the credibility of the patron's alleged support for its protégé and thus benefit the allies if the signal can potentially improve the protégé's gains over both shared and misaligned interests with its patron.
Motivated Reasoning in Intelligence Collection: A Rationalist Perspective
Status: working paper
Abstract: Many historical intelligence failures are attributed to motivated reasoning, a psychological tendency for policymakers to seek information that confirms preexisting optimism while avoiding evidence that might validate pessimism. This article offers a strategic rationale for this seemingly irrational pattern of intelligence collection. I develop a formal model of crisis bargaining in which a challenger and a target are uncertain about their relative strength, and the target can invest in intelligence to reduce this uncertainty. The analysis reveals that increased intelligence investment by the target can either deter or provoke the challenger, depending on the parties’ prior beliefs about the balance of power. When the common prior indicates a strong target, the target will benefit from substantial intelligence investment, which reinforces optimism and deters aggression. When the target is perceived as weak, limited investment benefits the target by generating strategic ambiguity and preserving the possibility of avoiding the worst-case scenario. The model further demonstrates that the probability of war is highest when the conflict parties are neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic about their relative power. The theory suggests that the tendency to seek reassuring information and avoid pessimism-inducing signals can be a rational response to uncertainty, even if it seems inefficient in retrospect. This perspective helps explain why institutional reforms are often ineffective in overcoming motivated reasoning and associated intelligence failures.
Status: working paper
Abstract: This article argues that the United States' influence over the United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) manifests through two closely related effects---Substitution Effect and Dominance Effect. The Substitution Effect implies that the US only delegates to the UN in crises in which the US has a lower stake, as the benefits associated with delegation outweigh the costs. The Dominance Effect implies that conditional on delegation, the UN will respond to US interests by allocating more resources in crises in which the US has a higher stake. The empirical results provide evidence in support of both effects in UN PKOs.
Democracy, Development, and Multilateralism: A Strategic Model of Vote Buying in the UN Security Council (with Jacque Gao)
Status: working paper
Abstract: This article examines the United States vote buying strategy in the UN Security Council by estimating a strategic statistical model. The results demonstrate that the United States is more willing to both punish democracies by withholding foreign aid for their opposition and reward democracies by increasing foreign aid for their support in the Security Council. However, the United States is much less willing to punish less developed countries for their opposition in the Security Council, even though coercion is a more effective strategy against poorer countries due to their vulnerabilities. Our results reveal the dualism in the United States aid’s purposes, and offer a mix of blessings and disappointments for the United States moral leadership.