Research
Research
The Interplay of Military Intervention and Peacemaking
Status: under review
Abstract: This article addresses the question of when a powerful third party has incentives to combine military intervention with peacemaking measures. Developing a formal model in which a foreign actor decides (1) whether to provide military support to its protégé and (2) whether to facilitate a peace settlement through security guarantees, I show that the two instruments can be either complementary or contradictory to each other, depending on the relative strength of the. If the protégé is relatively weak, the two instruments are complementary: security guarantees lock the protégé's gains from military support into a settlement, and military support improves the protégé's welfare in the settlement. A foreign actor who sufficiently values its protégé will combine these two instruments. Conversely, if the protégé is strong, the two instruments are contradictory: a settlement wastes the benefits of military support, while military support renders peacemaking efforts ineffective. The foreign actor will use at most one of the two instruments. The theory identifies conditions under which it is in the interest of a biased foreign actor to act as a neutral peacemaker. It also highlights the importance of introducing a second source of leverage beyond the mere manipulation of battlefield power in achieving meaningful peacemaking.
Leader-Contingent Sanctions as a Cause of Violent Political Conflict. 2025. Political Science Research and Methods, 13(1): 36-55. link
Abstract: Economic sanctions are a policy tool that great powers frequently use to interfere with domestic politics of another state. Regime change has been a primary goal of economic sanctions over the past decades. This article studies the relationship between leader-contingent sanctions---sanctions that are designed to impede the flow of revenue to a specific leader---and violent political conflict in target countries. I build a theoretical model to illuminate two mechanisms by which leader-contingent sanctions destabilize a regime---the Depletion Mechanism and the Instigation Mechanism. The Depletion Mechanism works when sanctions mechanically deplete the government's resources so that it becomes unable to buy off domestic opposition even by making the largest possible offer. The Instigation Mechanism implies that as sanctions decrease the benefit of negotiated settlement relative to war, the government may strategically choose to repress rather than buy off the opposition even when it is able to do so. Leader-contingent sanctions lead to bargaining failure by rewarding the opposition for revolt while reducing the government's ability and willingness to appease the opposition.
Intervention in the Shadow of Leadership Turnover (with Liqun Liu)
Status: under review
Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of war to examine how leadership turnover in a patron state shapes alliance behavior and the credibility of extended deterrence. When an incumbent anticipates being replaced by a less committed successor, she can increase support for her protégé not for immediate gains but to shape future engagement. By altering battlefield outcomes, such preemptive support may raise the future costs of disengagement and compel a reluctant successor to remain involved. In this way, the incumbent retains credit for success while shifting the burden of sustaining the conflict onto her successor. Leadership turnover can therefore make seemingly inefficient conflicts attractive. The model provides a rationalist explanation for how domestic leadership turnover can fuel costly international interventions.
The Presidential and Congressional Politics of US Foreign Aid
Status: work in progress
Abstract: This project explores how US presidents might use foreign aid budget proposals as a tool to pursue their foreign policy objectives. Empirical evidence shows that the amount of foreign aid requested by US presidents is significantly higher in presidential election years than in non-election years, while the amount of aid appropriated by Congress is not affected by election years. The effect of election years on presidential budget requests exists across different types of aid, such as security assistance, economic development assistance, and democracy and human rights assistance. In addition, the effect of election years on presidential budget requests is greater for states without formal alliance treaties with the US than for states with formal alliance treaties. Moreover, there is sometimes a gap between presidential budget proposals and congressional commitments, and this gap is significantly larger in presidential election years. This project seeks plausible explanations for these empirical patterns and provides insights into the nuanced relationship between presidential budget proposals and congressional commitments.
Misaligned Interests and the Credibility of Alleged Support. 2025. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 37(3): 232-257. link
Abstract: When can a third party manipulate the bargaining dynamics between its protégé and its adversary through diplomacy? I develop a formal model in which (1) the third party and its protégé have misaligned interests, and (2) the disputants bargain simultaneously over two issue dimensions---one capturing common interests, the other capturing misaligned interests between the allies. The results show that when the protégé and its patron have heterogeneous preferences for the disputed issues, the protégé will not necessarily use the patron's support in the way the patron wants. Patron's support increases the protégé's bargaining leverage, and how the protégé will use this increased leverage at the negotiating table directly affects the way the patron communicates. The existence of misaligned interests will increase the credibility of the patron's alleged support for its protégé and thus benefit the allies if the signal can potentially improve the protégé's gains over both shared and misaligned interests with its patron.
The Strategic Value of Observable Intelligence
Status: working paper
Abstract: Intelligence activities are often assumed to require secrecy. This article develops a game-theoretic model to show that a state can benefit when its adversary observes its intelligence collection effort during crisis bargaining. When a state is ex ante optimistic about its relative strength, greater intelligence effort is more likely to uncover favorable information. Observable effort to acquire information can induce the adversary to adopt a more conciliatory bargaining position. When the state is ex ante pessimistic, greater intelligence investment is more likely to reveal unfavorable information. Anticipating this, the state may strategically limit its intelligence effort and can be better off when the adversary observes this restraint. The theory contributes to the literature on information, diplomacy, and war by demonstrating that observable intelligence behavior can be strategically beneficial: under optimism, a state gains by revealing its capacity to confirm strength; under pessimism, it gains by revealing its limited capacity to uncover weakness.
Status: working paper
Abstract: This article argues that the United States' influence over the United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) manifests through two closely related effects---Substitution Effect and Dominance Effect. The Substitution Effect implies that the US only delegates to the UN in crises in which the US has a lower stake, as the benefits associated with delegation outweigh the costs. The Dominance Effect implies that conditional on delegation, the UN will respond to US interests by allocating more resources in crises in which the US has a higher stake. The empirical results provide evidence in support of both effects in UN PKOs.
Democracy, Development, and Multilateralism: A Strategic Model of Vote Buying in the UN Security Council (with Jacque Gao)
Status: working paper
Abstract: This article examines the United States vote buying strategy in the UN Security Council by estimating a strategic statistical model. The results demonstrate that the United States is more willing to both punish democracies by withholding foreign aid for their opposition and reward democracies by increasing foreign aid for their support in the Security Council. However, the United States is much less willing to punish less developed countries for their opposition in the Security Council, even though coercion is a more effective strategy against poorer countries due to their vulnerabilities. Our results reveal the dualism in the United States aid’s purposes, and offer a mix of blessings and disappointments for the United States moral leadership.